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This paper uses social movement theory to examine one way in which secondary stakeholders outside the corporation may influence organizational processes, even if they are excluded from participating in legitimate channels of organizational change. Using data on activist protests of U.S. corporations during 1962-1990, we examine the effect of protests on abnormal stock price returns, an indicator of investors' reactions to a focal event. Empirical analysis demonstrates that protests are more influential when they target issues dealing with critical stakeholder groups, such as labor or consumers, and when generating greater media coverage. Corporate targets are less vulnerable to protest when the media has given substantial coverage to the firm prior to the protest event. Past media attention provides alternative information to investors that may contradict the messages broadcast by protestors.• Hirschman (1970) was one of the first scholars to identify the means dissatisfied stakeholders use to gain influence inside the corporation. "Exit" takes resources (e.g., revenue) away from the firm as stakeholders seek other options. In contrast, "voice" involves an active effort to change the conditions that brought about dissatisfaction in the first place. Attempts to influence through exit, such as consumers switching to a different product, are ineffective when stakeholders constitute a disproportionately small share of the firm's base. In these situations, voice may be the only real option for influence-seeking stakeholders. Hirschman's (1970) ideas foreshadow recent scholarship at the nexus of social movements and organizational studies, which emphasizes social movements' collective ability to initiate institutional change via the expression of voice (e.g., Davis et al., 2005) . Some scholars in this area have examined how movements challenge institutionalized organizational arrangements and offer alternative organizing logics. For example, it has been demonstrated that movements can influence organizational decision makers to change policies related to employee benefits (Scully and Segal, 2002; Raeburn, 2004) or unionization (Manheim, 2001) and to adopt recycling programs (Lounsbury, 2001; Lounsbury, Ventresca, and Hirsch, 2003) . Others have examined how social movements can be agents of change in organizational fields by offering new solutions to collective problems or by creating competing organizational forms that undermine the field's stability (Hoffman, 1999; Schneiberg, 2002; Greenwood, Suddaby, and Hinings, 2002; Rao, Monin, and Durand, 2003) . Finally, other research has examined how corporate elites can organize social movements to influence state policies related to corporate interests (Davis and Thompson, 1994; Vogus and Davis, 2005) . Thus social movement theory's contribution to organizational studies has been to provide an explanation for the origin of change in highly institutionalized settings.
Much of this scholarship examines how social movement actors within organizations and industries challenge institutions (e.g., Zald and Berger, 1978; Lounsbury, 2001; Scully and Segal, 2002; Raeburn, 2004) , but we still know very little about how movements external to the organization attempt to influence organizational-level processes, policies, and procedures. That is, most research has focused on the insiders' paths to legitimate organizational change and has largely ignored the most provocative cases of outsiders' influence on the corporation. By external or outsider movements, we mean those collective attempts to influence corporate change that are initiated by the secondary stakeholders of a corporation.
In this paper, we address the lack of attention to outsiders' influence on corporations by examining the effect of social movement protests on firms' stock prices. Theoretically, this allows us to examine one of the most salient ways that outsiders can initiate change. By shaping investors' confidence in a corporation, activists influence corporate decision makers. If it can be demonstrated that protest is a viable form of corporate influence, we can make a strong case for Hirschman's (1970) voice as an avenue of corporate influence, even when expressed by secondary stakeholders. While past research has demonstrated that boycotts influence stock price (Pruitt and Friedman, 1986; Pruitt, Wei, and White, 1988) , we still know little about the effect that protests (although see Epstein and Schnietz, 2002) , in general, have on stock price, which kinds of protests have an effect, and what makes some corporations more vulnerable to protests.
Social movements can play an important role as extra-institutional entrepreneurs, external agents of change that attempt to reconfigure the meaning system and institutional logics on which a dominant system of authority is based. We use the term extra-institutional entrepreneurs to highlight the distinction between social movements and other institutional entrepreneurs whose purpose is to bring about change but who are also insiders (e.g., employees) to the corporation (Leblebici et al., 1991; Fligstein, 1997) . Social movements can be an important instigator of institutional change, even when insiders oppose this change. Understanding the role of social movements as extra-institutional agents of change also helps us to better understand the stakeholder environment of the corporation. Although there has been much discussion of a stakeholder theory of the firm (e.g., Donaldson and Preston, 1995) , we know very little about how secondary stakeholders, like activist groups, affect organizational policymaking (although see Baron, 2001 Baron, , 2003 Schneper and Guillén, 2004) . Finding evidence for social movement influence through protest makes a strong case for the potential efficacy of secondary stakeholders, given the radical, extra-institutional nature of protest.
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND CORPORATE TARGETS: THE USE OF PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS
Social movements emerge proactively as a collectively expressed grievance to a perceived social problem or reactively to a threatened change to a way of life (Tilly, 1978) . Rejected by the dominant standards of some portion of society, social movements adopt "oppositional identities" that pit their interests against power-holders in mainstream institu-tions (Taylor and Whittier, 1992) . Social movements thus target existing systems of authority, such as the state, non-governmental organizations, religious organizations, educational institutions, and, of course, corporations.
Despite the fact that movements address a variety of social problems in diverse societal spheres, scholars studying social movements have predominantly looked at those that target political or state-oriented systems of authority (Giugni, 1999; McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001; Van Dyke, Soule, and Taylor, 2004) . Scholarship has recently begun to examine the impact of movements on systems of authority other than the state, such as businesses or non-governmental organizations (e.g., Soule, 1997; Davis et al., 2005) .
As social movements attempt to create change in the world of corporations and business, they use a tactical repertoire designed to complement their status as outsiders to those corporations (Walker, 1991; Soule et al., 1999; King and Cornwall, 2005) . Frustrated by their inability to receive recognition via institutional means, social movements present themselves as alternative democratic voices. Perhaps the quintessential tactic that social movements use to do this is the protest demonstration, or the organized, collective, and public expression of discontent. Protest represents a more radical means of influence available to stakeholders mostly shut out from these other institutionalized channels of change.
Protest demonstrations-or protests for short-capitalize on the outsider status of individuals and movements that choose to use them. For example, protests involving picketing accentuate the extent to which activists are shut out from institutional channels of change by bringing their grievances to a public place and appealing to a wider audience than the decision makers operating behind closed doors. Protest is also explicitly a public action. Rather than going to authorities with expressions of desired changes and keeping this information and debate in a more closed environment, protestors choose to vent openly to a broad audience and bypass direct communication with insiders. Protest thus calls for the involvement of various audiences in the change process, appealing as much to the masses as to internal decision makers. As such, protest is a natural social movement tactic for corporate targets in which hierarchy is the dominant mode of governance. Like legislative bodies, corporations are public institutions that broadly affect social life. Unlike governmental organizations, however, corporations are not directly responsible for the welfare of the entire citizenry. This feature is accentuated in the United States, where the corporate governance system is characterized by a shareholder approach and dispersed ownership (Buhner et al., 1998; Roe, 2000; Guillén, 2000) . Under this approach, corporations' first responsibility is to shareholders, whose return to invested capital they try to maximize (Friedman, 1962) . The influence of other stakeholders (e.g., employees, communities, or social movement organizations) is much weaker, especially when those stakeholders lack resource leverage (Frooman, 1999) . Although this institutional context may be somewhat unique to the United States, the setting casts non-shareholder constituencies in the role of outsiders.
Furthermore, there are fewer channels whereby the public can access the hierarchy of corporate decision making. While legislatures and government agencies often have public forums in which interested citizens can express grievances and thereby attempt to influence decision making, most corporate decisions take place privately and involve only those actors whose bureaucratic responsibilities require their input. The forms of decision-making input for various stakeholders are often ambiguously interpreted. Market mechanisms, such as Hirschman's exit option discussed above, often do not adequately communicate stakeholders' grievances (Vogel, 2005) . Even if consumers, for example, decide to boycott a product due to dissatisfaction with a corporate policy, decision makers are unlikely to detect the cause of grievance unless the boycott is accompanied by some expression of voice, such as protest. Thus corporate policymaking is a more closed process than that of the polity, making protest a particularly appropriate tactic to be used by outsiders.
The importance of extra-institutional tactics is also discussed by Baron (2001 Baron ( , 2003 Baron ( , 2005 , who argued that non-market mechanisms are strategically chosen by activists to influence targets that are unsusceptible to market influence. When exit is not sufficient to spur change, activists may seek more direct tactics, like protest. The goal of non-market mechanisms, however, is ultimately to shape the way in which the larger public perceives the targeted issue, either through public opinion or through the media, and force concessions on the target firm (Baron, 2005) . This paper seeks to solve an important piece of that puzzle: given that activists resort to protest as a means of influence, what factors determine their ability to influence the firm's primary set of stakeholders, the investors?
The Influence of Protest on Stock Price
There are several reasons to suspect that social movement protests should not matter to investors and, ultimately, to corporate decision makers. If social movements lack internal influence through legitimate channels of change, executives might interpret protest as the discontent of a radical minority of stakeholders. Following the assumption that only stakeholder groups that leverage resources can exert corporate influence (Clarkson, 1995; Frooman, 1999) , we might expect that protest, as a tactic of last resort, would be relatively ineffective. One might also argue that corporate executives do not view protest as a serious threat to their firm or its market value because it does not provide any new information about the company. According to a semi-strong form of the efficient markets hypothesis, all relevant, publicly available information about a firm is already contained in its stock price (Fama, 1970) , and social movements tend to act on publicly available information. Nevertheless, protests can be relevant sources of new information about a firm's cash flow and, as such, can shape investors' confidence in the targeted firm. Protests vary in the kinds of information they communicate. Some protests, such as a sit-in or a boycott, may have their own disruptive effects on the firm. Other protests, such as demonstrations not occurring on the property of the company, do not necessarily impose costs, but they draw attention to existing stakeholder concerns and may cause investors to question the firm's managerial soundness (Oliver, 1992) . In both cases, the protest conveys information suggesting that the corporate target may have difficulty maintaining its current market value.
Investors may read the information generated by protests as signals of constraints on future cash flow. Social movement scholars have long argued that the disruptive qualities of protest are costly to its target (see Piven and Cloward, 1977; McAdam, 1982; Kennan, 1986; Gamson, 1990; McAdam and Su, 2002; Luders, 2006; Rojas, 2006) . In the case of corporate targets, investors may believe that protests threaten revenue flows or impose costs by tampering with organizational inputs, like labor or suppliers. One example of how protests threaten to impose disruption costs is through support of a consumer boycott. Some groups have used the boycott to effectively curtail sales, including animal rights groups aimed at deterring corporations from using animals in product safety tests (Friedman, 1999) . Politicized consumer groups are seen as threatening because firms are directly dependent on their support for survival. Peretti (2004) contended that protests and other activist tactics tend to politicize and globalize consumers' personal decisions, which makes them threatening in the eyes of investors and corporate decision makers. A second example, described by Luders (2006) , involves the protests of businesses in Greensboro, North Carolina during the 1960 civil rights sit-in campaign to protest segregation. Many businesses reported a loss of sales revenue as the sitin protests drove away regular customers who found the setting uncomfortable or distasteful. One Woolworth's manager reported that the "activities had cost the store some $200,000, and 1960 profits dropped by 50%" (Luders, 2006: 977) . Eventually Woolworth's and other store managers yielded to the protestors and consented to an integration agreement.
Although potential disruption costs are an important consideration, they are not the only, or even the most important information that protests yield. Most protests against corporations are fairly benign in their direct effects on business activity and may not sway investors to dispose of company stock quickly (Vogel, 2005) . Yet even if protests do not pose a direct threat to a firm's revenue, they still communicate dissatisfaction among stakeholders, and investors may see this dissatisfaction as a threat to a firm's reputation and legitimacy. Organizational scholars argue that reputation and legitimacy are intangible assets that firms use to acquire resources and create shareholder value (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Fombrun, 1996; Deephouse, 2000; Sanders and Boivie, 2004) . Investors may also fear that protest will actually intensify negative perceptions of the firm. If stakeholders were satisfied with the firm's practices before the protest, their feelings may consequently change. Protest, then, represents a threat to the intangible assets that are based in stakeholders' favorable perceptions (Elsbach, 2006) . Inasmuch as protest signals a decline in reputation and legitimacy, the market reacts to a protest as if it will lead to a loss in future cash flow. A protest's ability to communicate lost satisfaction among stakeholders was evident in the controversy surrounding Cracker Barrel's policy to dismiss all gay and lesbian employees of its restaurants in 1991. These dismissals occurred following a memo from the chief executive officer stating that the restaurant would not "continue to employ individuals .|.|. whose sexual preferences fail to demonstrate normal heterosexual values" (Niebuhr, 1991: C1) . The outraged National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (NGLTF) began staging protests of restaurants and formed a national boycott of the chain (Raeburn, 2004) . The NGLTF framed the actions of the restaurant chain as egregious and socially irresponsible. Fueled by the protests against the company and fearing a decline in their reputational standing, shareholders began making noise, despite the fact that there was no evidence of a drop in sales revenue. During the month of January in 1991, Cracker Barrel's stock fell an abysmal 26 percent below the expected return. Shareholders eventually introduced a resolution to force the company to adopt a nondiscrimination policy against those with same-sex orientation (Davis and Useem, 2002) . The decline in stock price coupled with shareholder resolutions undoubtedly spurred the executives to reconsider the policy. Even after the protests, Cracker Barrel continued to face criticism from activist groups and investors for having discriminatory employment policies (Adentuji, 2002) .
The protests used to defeat the licensing of the Shoreham nuclear power plant during the late 1970s and early 1980s also illustrate how protests raise questions about a company's legitimacy. In the early planning phases, public opinion favored the Long Island Lighting Company's (LILCO's) project to construct a nuclear plant in Shoreham, New York. After an initial approval, the anti-nuclear movement began to protest the construction of the plant. Aided by the imagery of a nuclear disaster following the accident at the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in 1979, anti-nuclear activists framed the new plant as a safety threat. Protests forced officials of LILCO to account for the growing public perception that nuclear energy posed a danger to local inhabitants (McCaffrey, 1991; Aron, 1998) . Rather than simply provide new information about the viability of the Shoreham plant, activists changed the debate from one of energy efficiency to a question of safety and emergency preparedness. This transformation changed investors' confidence in the project, generated community concern that LILCO did not regard safety as important, and ultimately caused an escalation of costs that forced LILCO to abandon the project (Ross and Staw, 1993) .
The protests of Cracker Barrel and LILCO both demonstrate that protests reveal information about stakeholders' previously ignored perceptions and may at times change perceptions among other key stakeholder groups. Investors fear that lack of public support for a corporation signals a decline in reputation and legitimacy. Investors recognize that without these intangible assets the target firms may be less capable of effectively carrying out their objectives. Also made evident by the above examples, protests often occur in a sequence of social movement activity. Activists may schedule multiple protests against a target corporation, often in various settings, to make a broad impact. But not all protests are equally effective. Some protests may escape the notice of the firm and its investors. Protests that receive no media coverage may be invisible to the broader public and investors. Because of this, activists often compete for media attention as a strategy for influencing public perception about a corporation (Baron, 2005) . As Lipsky (1968 Lipsky ( : 1151 argued, "If protest tactics are not considered significant by the media .|.|. protest organizations will not succeed. Like a tree falling unheard in the forest, there is no protest unless protest is perceived and projected." Therefore, the negative influence of protests is mediated by at least a minimal level of national media coverage. When protests are reported in the media, they signal to investors the potential disruptive costs and a loss of intangible assets on which the firm's cash flow depends. Based on these expectations, we suggest the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: Social movement protest events covered by the national media will provoke a negative reaction by investors in the target firm.
Although protests in general should be effective in causing at least some defection by investors, there is likely to be a great deal of variation in investors' reactions, as not all protests are equally effective. Certain protest events are better at generating negative information about the corporate target and thus will make investors more wary. As well, corporations will not be equally susceptible to the influence of protest. Some firms may be better positioned to buffer themselves from protests. To understand the dynamics of corporate protests that explain variation in investors' reactions to them, we need to examine those characteristics of protests that accentuate their information content and the features of corporate targets that buffer firms from the potentially damaging effect of protests.
The Effects of Protest Characteristics
Certain factors are known to be associated with the effectiveness of protests. For example, the level of threat posed by a protest has been shown to affect a number of different movement processes, such as favorable policy outcomes (Gamson, 1990) and police repression (Davenport, 2000; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy, 2003) . Threatening protests may be more effective signals to investors that stakeholders no longer trust a company and may be more disruptive. The overall level of threat posed by a protest should be positively correlated with its ability to influence investors' confidence.
One of the most common indicators of threat is protest size, typically measured by the number of participants. Large protests garner a more severe reaction from authorities (Earl, Soule, and McCarthy, 2003) and grab the attention of a wider public audience (Earl et al., 2004) . Larger protests also have a greater impact on their targets because of their ability to disrupt the target's routine activities (Luders, 2006) . Based on this, we offer a second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: The larger the protest is in size, the greater the negative reaction by investors to the target firm.
Another traditional indicator of threat is the organizational strength of the movement (McCarthy and Zald, 1977) . When multiple organizations collaborate to sponsor a protest, they draw on a larger resource base, which allows them to coordinate more effectively every aspect of the event (Gamson, 1990; Skocpol et al., 1993; Minkoff, 1997 Minkoff, , 1999 Soule et al., 1999; Cress and Snow, 2000; Andrews, 2001; Van Dyke, 2003) . Protests involving more organizations may also indicate to investors that the expressed grievance is widespread. Following these observations, we suggest the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: The greater the number of organizations sponsoring a protest event, the greater the negative reaction by investors to the target firm.
The effectiveness of the protest may also vary by the targeted issue. Issues relating to resource flows that are critical to the firm's survival may be particularly damaging to investors' confidence. This argument may be reformulated in terms of stakeholders: managers and investors view issues linked to stakeholder groups that are more central to the operations and functioning of the firm as more relevant and legitimate claims (Albert and Whetten, 1985; Clarkson, 1995; Mitchell, Agle, and Wood, 1997; Agle, Mitchell, and Sonnenfeld, 1999) . For example, the satisfaction of labor and consumers is necessary to maintain successful production and distribution processes. When either one of these constituencies becomes dissatisfied with the services of or their treatment by the firm, resource flows may be disrupted. These issues are likely to have more weight than others that relate to societal needs or collective goods, like the protection of the environment or moral claims made against the firm. Dissatisfaction with a company's environmental performance or moral stance rarely translates into revenue reductions (Vogel, 2005) . In contrast, companies that fail to address consumers' complaints, such as those relating to faulty products or labor grievances, face more serious direct consequences to their vitality. Investors are sensitive to changes in satisfaction among consumers and employees (e.g., Nayyar, 1995) , and they may see labor or consumer protests as reliable information about loss of consumer confidence or pending labor strikes. Thus protests relating to labor or consumer issues should be more troublesome to investors, given that they signal an underlying discontent with two stakeholder groups central to organizational survival. In addition, protests accompanied by consumer boycotts may constrain future revenue and directly threaten profitability. Based on these insights, we suggest the following two hypotheses:
Hypothesis 4: Protests relating to labor or consumer issues provoke a stronger negative reaction by investors to the target firm than protests relating to other issues.
Hypothesis 5: Protests accompanied by consumer boycotts provoke a stronger negative reaction by investors to the target firm than protests without boycotts.
Protests related to deep-seated issues involving the institutionalized policies and practices of a corporation may generate stronger investor reactions than protests dealing with temporary or situational organizational problems. Many protests aim to change fairly peripheral aspects of the organization, such as pricing or the release of an offensive product. Protests aimed at peripheral features may have relatively quick solutions, for example, a television network taking an offensive program off the air. Highly institutionalized practices or policies, in contrast, are costly to repair and may not have easy solutions. For example, corporations judged by protestors to have discriminatory hiring policies may have to undergo significant internal changes in order to address the grievance. Part of the cost is represented by the level of commitment that the organization made to previously defined rules, programs, and policies (Selznick, 1957) . These institutionalized features of the organization become highly resistant to change, as they take on cognitive legitimacy within the organization and represent significant resource endowments (Ghemawat, 1991) . Costs incurred by changes to these rules and policies have potentially greater negative effects on future firm performance than changes to more peripheral characteristics.
Hypothesis 6: Protests related to institutionalized programs, policies, or practices provoke a greater negative reaction by investors to the target firm than do protests related to more peripheral characteristics.
As we argued above, protestors need a minimum level of media coverage to communicate their grievances (Gamson, 2004; Baron, 2005) . But beyond this minimum level, investors should be more receptive to protests with greater levels of coverage. Intensified media coverage amplifies investors' attention and focuses it on negative aspects of a corporation's behavior and is a proxy for information about the value of a firm in the absence of firm-generated data (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Elsbach and Bhattacharya, 2001) . Additionally, under conditions of imperfect information, when investors are unaware of how salient an issue is in the public's mind, the level of media coverage of a protest may convey urgency (Baron, 2001) . Thus, controlling for the size of protest because larger protests would naturally get more media coverage, we suggest:
Hypothesis 7: Protests with greater levels of media coverage provoke a stronger negative reaction by investors to the target firm than protests with less coverage.
Effects of the Characteristics of the Corporate Targets
Characteristics of the targeted corporation may also influence the magnitude of the effects of some protests on stock price. Certain corporations may be more susceptible to protest influence because they do not have alternative information to offer investors that would alleviate concerns about the well-being of the company. Media representations of a corporation contain important information that shapes investors' sentiment (Deephouse, 2000; Rindova, Pollock, and Hayward, 2006) . We might expect that past media atten-tion to a firm has already significantly molded investors' perceptions of the target firm (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990) . Past media attention may thus actually protect firms from further reputational damage because firms that have been scrutinized in the past already have their public "warts" exposed. In addition, past media coverage may draw investors' attention to a variety of attributes, both positive and negative, that may offset the protest's effect (Elsbach and Bhattacharya, 2001) . Past media attention provides investors with sufficient information to dampen their negative reaction to protests and, as such, it can buffer firms from protests' negative impact.
Hypothesis 8: Companies with high levels of past media attention will experience less negative reaction to protest from investors than companies with low levels of past media attention.
Like past media attention to a firm, the financial security of the corporation may also mediate the effect of a protest on investors' perceptions. Firms with strong financial performance may also have excess cash flow to buffer them from potential costs from protests. Companies with strong cash flows facing protest should be less of a concern to investors than cash-strapped companies with precarious market positions. If protests contain information that makes investors concerned that future cash flow will be disrupted, firms with currently healthy cash flows will be more protected from this negative perception. Part of the buffering effect of financial performance may simply be due to the correlation of corporate reputation with financial performance (Fombrun and Shanley, 1990; Roberts and Dowling, 2002) . Firms with strong financial performance tend to have good reputations. Companies with poor financial performance should face greater scrutiny by investors and be more likely to experience retreat by investors when an attack is made against the firm.
Hypothesis 9: Companies with weaker financial performance will experience greater negative investor reaction to protest than those with stronger performance.
METHOD
To test these hypotheses, we assessed the extent to which a protest event affected the abnormal returns to a target firm's stock price. We used the event study methodology developed by finance scholars to assess the influence of a single protest event on stock price returns (e.g., Pruitt and Friedman, 1986; Koku, Akhigbe, and Springer, 1997; Epstein and Schnietz, 2002) . The event study structure uses the past performance of the firm's stock to calculate the extent to which the current performance of the stock deviates substantially from expected performance (see MacKinlay, 1997 , for a review).
Data on protest events were collected from daily editions of the New York Times (NYT) as part of a larger research project initiated by Doug McAdam, John McCarthy, Susan Olzak, and Sarah Soule (other papers using these data include McAdam and Su, 2002; Earl, Soule, and McCarthy, 2003; Van Dyke, Soule, and Taylor, 2004; Soule and Earl, 2005; Earl and Soule, 2006) . Researcher assistants content coded these events, achieving intercoder reliability rates that were consistently at or above 90 percent agreement. We then extracted news of protest events targeting public corporations between 1962 and 1990 from the larger protest data set. In addition to targeting a publicly traded corporation, we only used events that involved more than one person, because protests are collective expressions of discontent. Finally, the protest event must have happened publicly for us to include it in our analysis. So, for example, we did not count private arbitration between activists and a corporation. We omitted protest observations that occurred prior to 1962 due to missing financial data.
Newspaper data on protest events are one of the most frequently used forms of data in the field of social movements (see Earl et al., 2004 , for a review). Because of the popularity of newspaper data, there have been many attempts to assess the potential biases associated with this source. In particular, studies have asserted that there are two main sources of bias in newspaper data: selection bias and description bias. Selection bias refers to the fact that not all protest events will be covered by a given newspaper and the possibility that what is covered is not a random sample of all events that took place. Although no single newspaper contains all events in a given time period, this data source is ideal for our study, given that the New York Times covers a large metropolis and the financial center of the country. Because the major financial exchanges in the U.S. are located in New York City, the New York Times is ideally positioned to cover protests of business corporations. Moreover, the data collection methods used in this study are much more comprehensive than those in other event studies, given that the research assistants skimmed daily editions of the newspaper and identified all reported protest events. This strategy reduced selection bias by not introducing further sources of selection, in this case, researcher-induced or indexing-procedure-induced bias.
Description bias refers to the veracity of the event coverage. In their extensive review of the literature, Earl et al. (2004) concluded that the "hard news" (or the facts of the event) is generally accurately covered by newspapers. Because for this paper we draw on hard news items (as described below), and not on "soft news" items, such as opinions on the issue, we are confident that the accuracy of our data is acceptable.
As further evidence that our data source is comprehensive, we searched for data on events in both the Wall Street Journal and the Washington Post for six years (1964, 1968, 1974, 1978, 1984, and 1988) . Searching these sources for relevant keyword combinations (e.g., protest, activist, and demonstration) produced a small subset of the articles already found in our New York Times data. We found that the Wall Street Journal reported only 6 percent of the protest events covered by the New York Times. Only two protests during these six years were reported in the Wall Street Journal and not by the New York Times. The Washington Post reported less than 10 percent of all protests reported by the New York Times in these six years. And we found no events reported in the Washington Post that were not also covered in the New York Times. The Wall Street Journal appears to have covered some of the issues that motivated protests but often initiated coverage following the actual protest event, while the Washington Post tended to cover protests involving court cases, but not protest events targeting corporations. For example, both the Greensboro anti-segregation sit-ins and protests of the Cracker Barrel discrimination policy were covered by the New York Times shortly following the dates of the actual protests (Sitton, 1960; Smothers, 1991) , but the Wall Street Journal only immediately covered the Cracker Barrel protest (Niebuhr, 1991) . Neither of the other two newspapers appears to have covered protests that were not also reported by the New York Times. Thus we concluded that of the national newspapers, the New York Times provided the most comprehensive coverage of corporate protests.
In using the New York Times as a data source, we do not assume that this is necessarily the only source of information used by investors. We make no assumptions about the form of media or other private sources that investors use to get information about a protest event. Investors likely receive their news about firm-related events from a variety of sources, including but not limited to the New York Times (Figlewski, 1982; Brennan and Hughes, 1991; Barber and Odean, 2008) . Most event studies, in fact, begin calculating the event window prior to the day of the event precisely because some investors initially reacting to an event receive their information about the event from a private, non-news source, as when information is passed through social networks (e.g., Zajac and Westphal, 2004) . We make the same assumption. Information about a protest need only be held by a few investors for the information to diffuse to the larger investor population. For a stock price to change in reaction to a protest, it is only necessary for a few investors to get that information from a media source. One plausible way the information may enter the market is that a few initial investors who do have information about the protest react to the event, which then leads to feedback among additional investors (Shleifer, 2000) . Institutional investors of sufficient size could alone account for the price change, but given the presence of feedback processes, it is likely that other investors become aware of the protest event and the related issues. Further, if it is true that most investors do not consider the New York Times to be their primary source of information about the market, an analysis of protests' effect on stock price with data gathered from the New York Times is a strong test of the hypothesis. We therefore feel confident that our data source would not overstate the effect of protests on stock price.
The dependent variable in our analysis was the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) to a company's stock price. Because we were interested in investors' reaction to a particular protest event, we had to control for the marketwide fluctuations in stock price returns in addition to the correlation between a target firm's returns and the market return. Market fluctuations could occur for a number of exogenous reasons, none of which have to do with the protest event. Simi-larly, certain stocks are more likely than others to fluctuate in conjunction with the market. CAR is a standard measure of stock price return in event studies (Patell, 1976; Brown and Warner, 1985; Chatterjee, 1992; Gaver, Gaver, and Battistel, 1992; Zajac and Westphal, 2004) that allowed us to estimate fluctuation in stock price as it deviates from the expected return, based on exogenous market fluctuation. We obtained data on daily stock price returns from the CRSP database.
We derived CAR in three steps. First, we calculated the daily abnormal return for an individual stock. The daily abnormal return for a firm, j, is described as abnormal return jt = R jt -a j -b j R mt where R jt is the rate of return for a day around a protest event, and a jj and b j are regression coefficients taken from the following expected return equation:
where R jt is the rate of return for firm j for a period of days preceding the protest, R mt is the market return (the equally weighted daily return for all firms in the CRSP index) on day t, ␤ j is the systematic risk of firm j, ␣ j is the rate of return on firm j when R mt is zero, and ε jt is a serially independent disturbance term with E(ε jt ) = 0. R jt can be interpreted as the expected return for the stock of firm j holding constant shifts in the overall market portfolio. The regression coefficients for expected return were calculated for a 239-day period prior to the beginning of the event window. A 239-day prior period is often used in event study analyses (see, for example, Zajac and Westphal, 2004) . Thus the daily abnormal return tells us the difference between the actual daily stock price return and the expected return, which is based on a firm's stock price correlation with the CRSP equally weighted market index. A positive abnormal return indicates that a firm's return was greater than would be expected based on recent past performance. A negative abnormal return tells us that the stock price is declining compared with what we should expect.
We calculated CAR as the sum of all of the daily abnormal returns for a 26-day period around the protest event for each target firm. Included in the CAR window are the twenty days prior to the protest (day -20) and the five days following the protest event (day +5). We extended the window to twenty days prior to the event because, in many cases, information about a protest will leak to investors before it actually occurs. Some of the investor reaction may be in anticipation of the protest. In fact, if a social movement group announces the staging of a protest several days before the event, as often happens, one would expect investor reaction to begin in the days preceding the protest. CAR captures this information leakage (see Fama et al., 1969) . For this reason, most event studies have calculated CAR using a window that begins on a day prior to the actual event (e.g., Chatterjee, 1992 ing the CAR using this window conforms to similar analyses looking at the effects of boycotts on CAR (e.g., Pruitt and Friedman, 1986; Koku, Akhigbe, and Springer, 1997) and protest on CAR (e.g., Epstein and Schnietz, 2002) . To assure that the findings were not sensitive to the length of the window, we calculated CAR for two additional event windows, one window consisting of eleven days (day -5 to +5) and another window consisting of two days (day -1 to 0). The smaller windows provide a more conservative test, but they may not capture the entire effect of the protest on investors' behavior. We did not use a longer window following the protest (e.g., 180 days following the protest) because we were only interested in investors' initial reactions to protest and not on long-term effects. Over a longer period of time, other factors confound investors' reactions (including the corporations' response to the protest), while an analysis of a short time window more likely reflects the investors' initial judgments.
Because we were using CRSP data to calculate the CAR for firms targeted for protest, we only included those firms in the analysis for which daily stock return data were available. For firms that were protested on a non-trading day, we counted the event day as the first day of trade following the protest. Activists protested against some firms repeatedly in a short period of time. We were concerned that including protests with overlapping CAR windows would provide a biased estimate of investors' reactions. To deal with this, we only included the initial protest when protests occurred in the same month.
The resulting data set includes 342 protest events that occurred between 1962 and 1990. This number represents the entire set of protests reported in the New York Times that targeted publicly traded firms with available stock price data during this time period. Although this may not seem like a large number of protests, the data set allowed us to test hypotheses about the effect of protest on investors' reactions over a longer period of time and across a wider variety of protest issues than has been done in any other such analysis. Coders categorized protests into various issue categories, with protests against corporations covering 45 different issues, ranging from environmental concerns to sex discrimination complaints to morality issues. The most prominent were those addressing labor concerns (67 protests), nuclear threat and safety (38 protests), and discrimination against African-Americans (25 protests). The breadth of this data set makes our results generalizable to a variety of protests covered by the national media.
In addition to assessing the direct effect of protest on stock price returns to test hypothesis 1, we wanted to determine whether certain characteristics of a protest or of a target firm affected abnormal returns, to test hypotheses 2 through 9. To this end, in a second analysis, we regressed target firms' CAR on independent variables capturing variation in the mechanisms of protests' influence. We used the largest time window to capture variation in investors' reactions distributed unevenly around the protest event date.
According to hypotheses 2 and 3, larger protest events and protests with multiple sponsoring social movement organizations (SMOs) should have more negative returns because of the greater potential threat they may pose. To assess these hypotheses, we included two different variables. First, our measure of protest size is the total number of people involved in the protest divided by 1,000. Second, our measure of SMO involvement is the number of social movement organizations that were recorded as sponsoring a protest. Information on both of these variables came from the New York Times articles used to generate the protest event data set.
To test hypothesis 4, on the effect of two different issues articulated at a protest, we included two variables indicating whether the protest targeted labor-or consumer-related issues. These are dummy variables that equal 1 if labor or consumer issues were mentioned during the protest itself and 0 if otherwise. Note that these protests did not include labor strikes or other union-sponsored events. The protests in our dataset were generated by activists in the social movement sector that were sympathetic with labor causes but that were not union-driven. For example, in 1986, 200 junior high and high school students in Austin, Minnesota left classes to march in support of striking workers of the Hormel Food Company. The march was not sponsored by union organizers, but it did center on a labor issue. Recognizing that strikes may actually be driving down stock prices in these cases, we also included a control variable to indicate whether a strike occurred during the event window of the protest.
To test hypothesis 5, that protests accompanied by a boycott would lead to a greater decline in stock prices, we included a dummy variable indicating whether the protest was associated with a consumer boycott. In our data set, 7 percent of the protests were coupled with a consumer boycott. Examples of protests accompanied by boycotts included a 1970 boycott of the energy company, Consolidated Edison, by New York residents who protested drastic rate increases and a 1990 boycott by civil rights activists of Nike to encourage the company to do more business with black-owned businesses.
To test hypothesis 6, that protests directed at an institutionalized feature of a firm would lead to greater declines in stock prices, we included a dummy variable indicating whether the protest targeted such an institutionalized organizational program, policy, or practice (e.g., hiring policies, investment practices). Issues not considered institutionalized features of the organization include decisions like changing a pricing scheme or releasing a new product.
To determine whether the amount of media coverage of a protest event negatively affected returns, we included a measure of the number of paragraphs in the New York Times article dealing with the protest event. We recognize that all of the protest events in our data set had sufficiently high media salience to have been covered by a national newspaper, but this measure allowed us to capture variation in the extent to which the media focused on a given event. To test hypothesis 8, that firms that received more past media attention would be less susceptible to declines in stock prices as a result of protest, we included a measure of the number of articles in the New York Times citing the target firm in the year preceding the protest event window.
To assess hypothesis 9, that companies with weaker financial performance would experience greater declines in stock price, we included a measure of industry-adjusted cash flow. We used cash flow as an indicator of performance because research shows that cash flow is often managed by firms to create the outward appearance of elevated financial performance (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997) . Cash flow also captures the extent to which firms have excess resources with which to absorb potential costs. Cash flow is a firm's operating income plus depreciation value divided by the firm's common shares. This measure is then adjusted for the industry mean cash flow for that given year (cash flow -mean industry cash flow). Data for this and other financial variables came from Standard and Poor's COMPUSTAT database.
We also included several control variables in our analysis. First, we included a variable indicating whether the target firm of the protest was a subsidiary of a larger corporation. Targets of protest that are subsidiaries may be less scrutinized by investors because their operations may be only loosely coupled with the performance of the stock price. Second, we controlled for the size of the firm by including the natural logarithm of corporate assets. Third, because some protest events last longer than others and thus may potentially provoke a stronger reaction among investors, we included a variable measuring protest length, which is a dummy variable equaling 1 when the protest occurred over a series of days. Fourth, as mentioned above, we controlled for the presence of a labor strike during the event window. Fifth, we controlled for other issue-specific effects to validate the uniqueness of labor and consumer issues on investors' perceptions of the firm by including two dummy variables to indicate protests related to environmental and morality issues. Table 1 contains descriptive statistics and correlations for all independent variables. Although there were 342 protest events in the event study, we lost 55 observations in the regression analysis because of gaps in the COMPUSTAT data. We did not observe any substantive differences between the protests for which financial data were available on the target firm and those protests for which data were unavailable. Although it is impossible to assess, given lack of comparable data, censored firms may have been smaller and younger than those included in COM-PUSTAT. Following standard practice in financial analysis, we also did not include any cases in the regression model for which confounding events occurred in the time window of the analysis. Confounding events include corporate restructuring, price changes, new products, dividends or earnings announcements, joint ventures, acquisitions, litigation, executive changes, changes in forecasted earnings, layoffs, debtrelated events, or contract awards. Confounding events are significant corporate events, other than protests, that may change the market return for the observed time period. Thus we lost an additional 32 observations due to confounding events. We used standard OLS regression to obtain estimates, as is common for analyses in which the dependent variable is the firm's CAR (e.g., Kale, Dyer, and Singh, 2002) . Because we had multiple observations for some firms in the analysis, we obtained robust standard errors by clustering the observations by firm. We also included annual time dummies in the analysis (not shown in the results) to control for unmeasured temporal heterogeneity. Checking the VIF scores, we determined that multicollinearity was not a problem in the model.
Event Analysis of CAR
To test hypothesis 1, that protest events lead to negative returns to stock price, we assessed the statistical significance of the CAR. The null hypothesis is that CAR equals zero across the event period given that market returns, net of exogenous market effects, are thought to be randomly distributed. Any significant deviation from random returns indicates that the protest event had a discernable effect on a firm's stock price. A negative CAR indicates that a firm exhibited returns below that which we would expect based on past performance. Table 2 shows the test statistics for CAR for the 26-day event window, as well as the two shorter event windows, 11-and 2-day. The first column shows the mean CAR for firms targeted by protest. This is expressed as a percentage and can be thought of as the mean cumulative percentage change in a stock price below that which was expected. The second column shows the cumulative average abnormal return (or CAAR). This is an alternative way of signifying average change and can be interpreted as the cumulative percentage change in the daily means of the firms' abnormal returns. The third column contains Patell's Z, which is a standard measure of statistical significance in event studies (Patell, 1976) . The mean CAR and CARR are both negative in all three windows and are statistically significant from zero using Patell's Z as a test of significance. These indicators provide strong evidence that protest has a significant negative influence on investors' confidence. Rather than fluctuating randomly, stock prices tend to fall in the window of time around a protest event. Stock prices, on average, declined by 1 percent during the 26-day event window. Importantly, the magnitude of the effect of protest is comparable to the effect that other major corporate events have on abnormal 430/ASQ, September 2007 Figure 1 shows the distribution of daily abnormal returns over the 26-day time window. The figure only includes those abnormal return values that were statistically significant from the expected market return. The figure demonstrates that, as we hypothesized, firms that were targets of protest experienced significant declines in stock price. returns. Using corporate acquisitions as a benchmark and adjusting for a similar time window, the effect of protest on stock price returns is about 70 percent of the effect of acquisitions on returns (Dyer, Kale, and Singh, 2004) .
429/ASQ, September 2007

Social Movements
Scholars using the event study methodology have argued that results may be biased if cases associated with potential confounding events are included in the analysis (McWilliams and Siegel, 1997) . To check the robustness of these findings, we ran the analyses again, eliminating cases in which confounding events occurred in the time window. In the reduced analyses, we had 274 observations. In the bottom three rows of table 2, we list those returns. Although the size of the returns is slightly smaller, these robustness checks confirmed the finding that protests reduced the stock price of the targeted firm.
Regression Analysis of CAR
Effects of protest characteristics. Table 3 shows the results of models regressing CAR, expressed as a percentage change from expected returns, on a set of independent variables described above. Based on these results, it appears that investors are greatly concerned about the nature of the issue that is protested. Protests targeted at labor and consumer issues led to lower than expected returns to stock price. This provides support for hypothesis 4, that protests targeting issues related to critical resource inputs should make investors more wary. Because both labor and consumers are valued inputs to organizational success, investors may fear that protests indicate problems with key stakeholders and may signal a decline in future cash flow.
Surprising to us, the size of the protest, organizational involvement, and the presence of a boycott do not have statistically significant effects. One might argue that the threat of a boycott may depend on the size of the threat or the amount of media attention given to the protest. Larger protests may signal to investors the threat of a larger loss to revenue. Alternatively, media coverage may amplify the potential threat of a boycott. We tested both of these possibilities in models 2 and 3 by including interactions (separately) of the boycott variable and media coverage (model 3) and protest size (model 2). We mean centered the continuous variables used in these interaction effects to reduce prob-431/ASQ, September 2007 lems associated with multicollinearity. The results provide little support for these arguments. Neither interaction effect is statistically significant. We therefore do not find support for the idea that investors view protests associated with boycotts as more threatening.
Social Movements
Media coverage of the event also has a negative effect on stock price. For each additional paragraph written about the protest in the New York Times, stock price returns decline a 432/ASQ, September 2007 tenth of a percent below that which is expected. This effect is quite significant, given the extensive media coverage given to some protests. The median article consisted of eight paragraphs, and the longest article in our data set consisted of 202 paragraphs. Thus extensive media coverage significantly swayed investors' reactions to protests.
Effects of corporate targets. According to our findings, some corporations are more capable of buffering themselves from the negative effects of protest. Our analysis provides support for the hypothesis that past media attention to the firm positively affects returns. This suggests that when attention to a firm is high, investors, and the public more generally, already have sufficient information about the target firm to make an assessment of its market value. Because extensive past media coverage may have already shaped investors' perceptions, protests may not provide much new information to investors. The significance of this effect points to the importance of protest as an information source for investors. We did not find support for hypothesis 9, that financial performance protected corporate targets from protest influence.
Robustness checks. We conducted additional analyses to check the robustness of the findings presented in table 3. In particular, we wanted to correct for the potential of selection bias. Not all firms are equally likely to face protest, as activists pick their targets strategically, focusing their efforts on firms that are most salient to the public (Baron, 2001 (Baron, , 2005 . Furthermore, past protest against the target may both affect the likelihood that the company will be protested against in the future and change the way in which the public reacts to future protests. We might expect, for example, that investors will become indifferent to protests if a particular corporation is targeted frequently. Some industries may also experience higher levels of protest (e.g., firms in the apparel industry were targeted for protest frequently in the 1980s for their labor policies). Intra-industry protest levels may have the same kinds of endogenous effects on the way that investors perceive future protests.
To assess to what extent past protests influence investors' perceptions, we added two control variables to the analysis that measure the number of past protests against the firm and the number of past protests against other firms in the target's main industry. Both variables capture the number of protests in the five years preceding the focal event. For the second variable, industry was conceived as the target firm's primary Standard Industrial Classification grouping. Model 4 in table 3 shows the results for this model. Because we did not have protest data for the years prior to 1960 and we needed five years of data to construct these variables, we omitted cases prior to 1965. The results provide general support for the main findings. More importantly, we find that these variables do not have statistically significant effects on the CAR. Thus we do not find support for the idea that the number of past protests directed at the firm or at other firms in the firm's industry influences investors' perceptions. model predicting the likelihood that a firm is targeted for protest and of a model predicting investors' reaction to that protest. To account for this selection bias, we ran a regression model using Heckman's (1979) two-stage estimation. The intuition of this model is that the estimates in the abnormal returns regression need to be corrected for the propensity of certain firms to be targeted by protestors. To do this analysis, we obtained data on all firms operating in the same industry as known protest targets. We first conducted a Probit analysis assessing the probability that a specific firm would be the target of protest. From this, we generated an estimate for selection correction, known as the inverse Mills ratio or λ. Substantively, λ can be interpreted as the probability that a firm will not be targeted for protest. Adding this selection coefficient to the CAR regression model assures that our results will be unbiased and consistent if the errors between the two models are correlated. This approach is a standard method for dealing with selection bias in the management literature (e.g., Shaver, 1998; Leiblein, Reuer, and Dalsace, 2002) . We used STATA's heckman function to perform the regression and adjusted standard errors by clustering cases at the firm level. Table 4 contains the results for the Probit model. The regression reveals that protestors tend to target large, weakly performing firms. Firms that have been targeted by protestors in the past are more likely to be protested against in the future.
Model 5 in table 3 contains the second-stage results of the Heckman selection analysis. Correcting for the selection effect, the coefficients do not change greatly from the standard OLS estimates. Moreover, the selection correction effect is not statistically significant, indicating that unobserved heterogeneity predicting the occurrence of protest against a firm does not predict investors' reactions to that protest. This result leads us to conclude that estimates obtained from the OLS regression are unbiased.
We ran additional robustness checks with models that included firm fixed effects for firms that had multiple observations and checked for temporal interaction effects by running the model for targeted firms in each decade. Although the coefficients were not always significant due to loss of statistical power (e.g., a fixed-effects model dropped the N from 287 to 223), the results of these robustness checks supported our findings. We also checked for bias that may result from out-434/ASQ, September 2007 liers in the dependent variable. Regressions in which cases were dropped when the CAR fell in the 95th percentile had similar results to those presented here. We also ran a model using weighted-least-squares regression, in which protest events are weighted by the proportion of all protests that occurred in a given year. This weighting corrects for potential heteroskedasticity problems that would result if the proclivity to protest in a given year was attributable to an exogenous event that affected corporate targets in the same way. Again, this additional model did not substantively differ from those presented in table 3. Results from these additional models are available upon request.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
This paper explored the effect of social movement protests on a key medium of communication in the contemporary corporate world, change in stock price. We found that social movements can affect stock price by staging public protests and garnering media coverage. Our analyses also demonstrated that some protests are more effective at causing an investor reaction, and some corporations are more susceptible to protest influence than others.
Activists are most influential when they target critical issues like labor or consumer issues. Thus it appears that a protest's effect is at least partially a function of its ability to inform investors about dissatisfaction among key stakeholder groups whose support is critical to the survival of the organization. This finding does not imply that consumer-and labor-related protests are the only kinds of protests that affect investors, and in fact, deleting these cases from the analysis does not change the findings greatly. But the results do suggest that certain stakeholder groups have more influence than others. This finding pushes us to consider the power dynamics that may underlie stakeholders' influence. Activists do not protest on a level playing field, given that some social movement groups advocate issues that are given greater weight by investors.
Our findings highlight the importance of media coverage as an important mediator of activists' influence. Social movement activists compete with other organizational stakeholders for media coverage as a means to frame information about corporations. Activists who are more successful in shifting attention to their activities are more effective at gaining influence through non-market mechanisms. Thus part of activists' influence is exerted indirectly through the media (Baron, 2005) .
It is surprising to see that boycotts, which could conceivably have a direct impact on a firm's revenues, do not affect investors' perceptions. As Vogel (2005) argued, however, most boycotts are ineffective in shaping consumers' buying habits. If investors learn that boycotts do not actually threaten revenue, then they would not react negatively to protests associated with boycotts. Of course, this finding should not be interpreted to mean that boycotts by themselves do not negatively influence investors' perceptions of the firm. Rather, boycotts do not make protests any more effective than they already are.
In addition, we found that certain corporations are more susceptible than others to the negative effects of protest. Protests upset investors' confidence by providing a signal to them that something is amiss. Social movement protestors contest the appropriateness of corporate practices. In response, the target firm must develop a plausible account in response to the protestors' complaints. Inasmuch as protest provides information about a firm's ability to secure future cash flow, investors need assurance that cash flow is not being jeopardized. Past media attention may provide evidence that contradicts activists' claims. Past media attention, as an alternative source of information that investors can use to assess the corporation's financial fitness, buffers a protest's target.
One limitation of this study is that we only examined the effects of protests staged in the United States. Although this is an important set of observable protests, given the stature of U.S.-based corporations globally, the results should be interpreted as limited to a particular type of institutional environment. Notably, organizational scholars have argued that U.S. corporations are extreme in their adherence to a shareholder view of the firm, wherein the primary purpose of the firm is to create shareholder wealth regardless of the effects of corporate actions on other stakeholders (Guillén, 2000; Roe, 2000) . Corporations based in other countries, like Germany and Japan, are more likely to take a stakeholder-centered approach to corporate governance (Schneper and Guillén, 2004) . In a stakeholder-centered model, stakeholders have more power over corporate decision making. Thus in the setting observed for this study, corporations are likely to treat secondary stakeholders like social movement activists as true corporate outsiders. In settings in which the stakeholder-centered approach dominates, activists may have more insider status in corporate governance, making protest less likely and perhaps changing investors' reaction to staged demonstrations.
Contributions and Future Research
Although organizational theorists have become more interested recently in social movement theory as a way of thinking about processes and causes of organizational change (Davis et al., 2005) , very little research has addressed how social movements as organizational outsiders influence firms. Given the fact that many social movements lack access to the traditional channels of corporate decision making, one contribution of this study to the literature is its examination of the efficacy of an alternative mechanism of influence available to these outsiders. On a more theoretical level, institutional and organizational scholars need to address the question of how institutional outsiders gain influence in realms of society where there are no or few legitimate avenues of influence. One answer seems to be that outsiders may indirectly attempt to influence institutional insiders who have a more direct stake in the operation and functioning of the institution, in this case, the corporation.
Hirschman (1970) led the way in the discussion of corporate outsider influence by noting that stakeholders can attempt influence through exit or voice. Our analysis indicates that voice, as an alternative to exit that is available to secondary stakeholders, is a powerful mechanism to influence the exit of other, more influential stakeholders. By expressing discontent with a corporation's policies or practices, stakeholders who might be considered irrelevant under normal circumstances gain leverage over valuable resources (the market capital of the firm). As Hirschman originally stipulated, voice and exit are often interdependent mechanisms. Exit, in this case, is not only strengthened by the expression of voice, it is actually instigated by voice. The combination of voice with exit gives the change of stock price a substantive meaning that it would not have under normal circumstances.
The findings of this study make it apparent that social movements, despite their status as outsiders, can have real influence in the corporate sphere. Their role as outsiders gives them a unique place. Rather than participating in decisionmaking processes directly, they are often forced to the periphery, where they actively engage in meaning-construction activities that shape the way the public perceives typically closed-off corporations. Through protest, social movements act as extra-institutional entrepreneurs, with the goal of changing the discussion and debate surrounding the targeted corporation (Rao, Morrill, and Zald, 2000; Fligstein, 2001a Fligstein, , 2001b . A central task of extra-institutional entrepreneurs is to reconstruct the meaning environment around a focal organization so that changes-technological or those relating to organizational policies-are freer to take place (Munir and Phillips, 2005) . Movement activity is oriented in broader institutional logics that provide activists with the cultural and discursive tools used to destabilize institutionalized corporate interests (Lounsbury and Glynn, 2001) . Protests' stark contrast with legitimate channels of change is an important source of their influence. Although we did not directly assess consequent changes within the targeted corporations, we clearly demonstrated that social movements play a part in shaping the corporate environment. By changing investors' perceptions of a firm's value, they make executives in the target firm aware of their grievances and force elite decision makers to deal with problems that they would rather not address.
Our findings also have implications for those who study corporate social responsibility as a part of a firm's strategic mindset (e.g., Mackey, Mackey, and Barney, 2007) . Social movements play an active role in the construction of corporate social responsibilities (Swanson, 1999; Whetten, Rands, and Godfrey, 2001; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001 ). Inasmuch as social movements translate stakeholders' concerns into corporate financial costs (loss of equity capital), movements are capable of forcing a firm to take stakeholders into account when setting strategy. One of the main implications, we believe, of the finding that protests affect stock market returns is that corporations can be shown the strategic value of paying attention to societal stakeholders who may not have a direct investment in the firm (Hart, 2005) . If firms do not incorporate activists as a part of the internal decisionmaking process, they run the risk of giving them reason to express their grievances publicly, at which point the corporation loses control of the issue to the public. Managing relations with stakeholder groups, no matter how irrelevant their concerns may appear to be, is an important firm behavior. We demonstrated here the link between this aspect of image management and stock price performance, but clearly the implications are broader. Improper management of stakeholders' concerns likely affects various components of the corporation's image, including its reputation.
The findings also suggest that certain stakeholder groups will be more influential than others. Obviously, much of the influence of stakeholder groups is due to their ability to leverage resources (Clarkson, 1995; Frooman, 1999) , but stakeholder groups without the direct ability to threaten costs may also gain some influence. These stakeholders gain influence by manipulating public perceptions through the media to broadcast negative images of the corporation. Future researchers examining stakeholders' influence should pay attention to a group's skill in using the media as a potential resource.
The paper also speaks to the study of the outcomes of social movements. While earlier research by social movement scholars has focused almost exclusively on outcomes in the political domain (Giugni, 1999) , this study emphasized the importance of looking at additional types of movement outcomes. In particular, social movement scholars should pay more attention to movements that target corporations and other business organizations. Given the central role that business organizations play in contemporary society, it is curious that social movement scholars have not yet made this a focus of their research.
Future research might expand on the findings of this paper in several ways. First, case studies are needed to flesh out the theory proposed in this paper. In particular, we need to know more about strategies used to affect corporations through extra-institutional means. Are protestors aware of investors as a powerful audience? If so, do they plan protests in a way that attracts the attention of the investing public? Second, scholars should examine the effects of decreased returns to stock price on corporate decision makers. We argued in this paper that protest and investors' reaction to it is a mechanism for understanding organizational change. Future research might investigate this causal chain further. Scholars should also explore further the various framing tools that movements use to influence corporate insiders. If one of the primary functions of protest is to disrupt image management, scholars should focus more attention on the various ways that movements frame their resistance to corporations and other dominant systems of authority. Finally, future research should explore the cross-institutional differences of social movements' access to corporate decision making and its consequences for outsiders' influence. Not all institutional arrangements are equally closed to stakeholders' influence (Guillén, 2000) . Future research examining activist influence across a variety of contexts would further enrich our understanding of the mechanisms underlying stakeholder-initiated corporate change. But importantly, this study provides strong evidence that, even in the relatively closed U.S. corporate
